Abstract. A recently proposed class of multivariate Public-Key Cryptosystems, the Rainbow-Like Digital Signature Schemes, in which successive sets of central variables are obtained from previous ones by solving linear equations, seem to lead to ecient schemes (TTS, TRMS, and Rainbow) that perform well on systems of low computational resources. Recently SFLASH (C * − ) was broken by Dubois, Fouque, Shamir, and Stern via a dierential attack. In this paper, we exhibit similar algebraic and diential attacks, that will reduce published Rainbow-like schemes below their security levels. We will also discuss how parameters for Rainbow and TTS schemes should be chosen for practical applications. Keywords: rank, dierential attack, algebraic attack, oil-and-vinegar Note: This is an update to the paper to appear at ACNS 2008, New York 1 Outline Multivariate Public-Key Cryptosystems (MPKCs, or trapdoor MQ schemes) are cryptosystems for which the public key is a set of polynomials P = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) in variables x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) where all variables and coecients are in K = GF(q). In practice this is always accomplished via
Dierentials also helps with randomized brute-force searches for S and T . We can assess how Rainbow-like schemes needs to be amended in view of recent developments.
The results are in line with experiments run on small scale systems.
In Sec. 2 we recap Rainbow-like multivariates and what is known about the security of MPKC before the appearance of Rainbow in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we describe the new dierential attack, which is related to the high-rank attack, and in Sec. 5 we present new paramters for Rainbow construction, we tabulate what we know about the security of Rainbow-like schemes, in particular, the security against the two new recent attacks specially targeted against the Rainbow schemes, and we design schemes with new parameters for practical applications. Finally, in Sec. 6, we present the conclusion. 2 
Rainbow-like Multivariate Signatures
We characterize a Rainbow type PKC with u stages:
The segment structure is given by a sequence 0 < v 1 < v 2 < · · · < v u+1 = n. 
In every q k , k ∈ O l , there is no cross-term x i x j where both i and j are in O l at all. So given all the y i with v l < i ≤ v l+1 , and all the x j with j ≤ v l , we can compute x v l +1 , . . . , x v l+1 .
To expedite computations, some coecients α ijk 's may be xed (e.g., set to zero), chosen at random (and included in the private key), or be interrelated in a predetermined manner.
To invert Q, determine (usu. at random) x 1 , . . . x v1 , i.e., all x k , k ∈ S 1 . From the components of y that corresponds to the polynomials q v1+1 , . . . q v2 , we obtain a set of o 1 equations in the variables x k , (k ∈ O 1 ). We may repeat the process to nd all remaining variables.
In this form, we can see that Rainbow can only be a signature scheme. We can see a good example of what can go wrong in [15] if we try to construct an encryption scheme, where the initial vinegar variables is determined through an initial block of equations. Example 1. enTTS (20, 28) of [25] has structure (8, 9, 1, 1, 9) and this central map: 
If x 0 , . . . , x 7 is decided, one can solve rst for x 8 , . . . , x 16 , then x 17 , x 18 , then x 19 , . . . , x 27 . Note: x 0 does not appear until the last block, which will be signicant later.
Example 2. The proposed Rainbow scheme in [7] is an essentially generic stagewise UOV construction with layers (6, 6, 5, 5, 11 Rainbow schemes where most of the crossterm coecients α (k) ij are zero are said to be TTS instances. TTS schemes have a relatively small private key and even better eciency, but may be exposed to additional risks. Regardless, the same techniques that we shall describe below are security concerns for all schemes of the rainbow type including TTS, TRMS, and Rainbow [7, 20, 25] .
The Security of Multivariates and Prior Attacks
The name of the class came from the Multivariate Quadratics problem:
Problem MQ: Solve the system p 1 = p 2 = · · · = p m = 0, where each p i is a quadratic polynomial in x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and coecients and variables are in K = GF(q).
Generic MQ is NP-hard [12] , and consensus pegs it as a dicult problem to solve even probabilistically. However, to use MQ as the underlying hard problem in a PKC, one need a trapdoor built into the public map P. So the security of the cryptosystem also depends on the following:
Problem EIP: (Extended Isomorphism of Polynomials) Given a class of central maps C and a map P expressible as P = T • Q • S, where Q ∈ C, and S, T are ane, make such a decomposition.
There are two interesting twists here:
If Q is constant, this is known as the IP problem. J.-C. Faugère showed that in some cases simple IP is not NP-hard at Eurocrypt 2006 [11] .
The EIP problem where C is the set of homogeneous quadratic maps is easy [13] . Equivalently, if Q is homogeneous (e.g., as in SFLASH=C * − ) we can set c S = c T = 0.
If Q fundamentally involves a map in a eld L = K k that is of a size significantly bigger than K, we call the scheme big eld or dual eld. This order includes derivatives of Matsumoto-Imai (C * ) and Hidden Field Equations. Otherwise we call the scheme a true multivariate (sometimes single eld). This includes the Unbalanced Oil-and-Vinegar and stagewise triangular structures.
One of the biggest concerns of multivariate cryptography is the lack of provable security results. Today security in MPKC is still very much ad hoc. Proposed schemes are evaluated against known attacks security estimates obtained for various parameters. The designers then tries to juggle the system parameters so as to have some requisite security level under every known attack.
With that, we list the standard attacks known for MPKCs today:
1. Rank (or Low Rank, MinRank) attack, which nds a central equation with least rank [25] .
Here as below, the unit m is a multiplications in K, and r is that lowest rank (MinRank, [14] ). µ is the number of linear combinations of central equations [25] at that minimal rank. 2. Dual Rank (or High Rank) attack [5, 14] , which nds a variable appearing the fewest number of times in a central equation cross-term. If this least number is s, [25] gives
3. Oil-and-Vinegar Separation [16, 17, 22] , which nds an Oil subspace that is suciently large (estimates as corrected in [25] ).
o is the max. oil set size, i.e., there is a set of o central variables which are never multiplied together in the central equations, and no more. 4. Trying for a direct solution (i.e., going for the MQ as opposed to the EIP or structural problem). Best known methods are the Lazard-Faugère family of solvers (the Gröbner Bases methods F 4 -F 5 or XL) whose complexities [6, 9, 10, 24] are very hard to evaluate; some recent asymptotic formulas can be found in [1, 2, 24] .
Given the public key of a MPKC, which we denote as P(x), a set of quadratic polynomials, its dierential DP(x) is dened as
The key is to use the hidden structures in the dierential to attack the cryptosystem. The observation is that the dierential can be used to improve the old high-rank attack when there are too many variables that don't appear in the nal block of equations (for y i , where i ∈ O u ). First, we will reformulate an existing attack in terms of the dierentials.
Let H i be the symmetric matrix corresponding to the quadratic part of z i (w). Without loss of generality, we may let the fewest number of appearances of all variables in the cross-terms of the central equations be the last variable x n appearing s times. 
Form an arbitrary linear combination H
As each trial run consists of running an elimination and some testing, we can realistically do this with ∼ sn 2 + 
The above formulation of the high rank attack is designed to defeat plusmodied Triangular systems. We rst present some notations before describing how we can improve this attack further: Let P l be the linear space of quadratic polynomials spanned by polynomials of the form
We can see that these are Oil and Vinegar type of polynomials such that x i , i ∈ O l are the Oil variables and x i , i ∈ S l are the Vinegar variables. We call x i , i ∈ O l an l-th layer Oil variable and x i , i ∈ S l an l-th layer Vinegar variable.
We call any polynomial in P l an l-th layer Oil and Vinegar polynomial. Clearly we have P i ⊂ P j for i < j. Let W i be the space of linear functions of variables x 1 , ..., x v i . Then we have
Now we present the new attack:
Algorithm 1 The Improved High-Rank Attack using dierentials:
, and we will denote its components as
2. Guess at a linear form f ∈ U ; nd coecients a i and 
Proof. Let
. . , b n ) is randomly chosen. Pick another b and form In fact, it is not so hard to describe how to determine d. W u+1 and W u+1 are two m-dimensional subspaces in the n-dimensional vector space W u+1 . Most of the time they intersect in a 2m − n dimensional subspace, hence
which equals the number of variables appearing in cross-terms in equations not of the nal block, which is equivalent to Eq. 2.
Example 3. Consider enTTS (20, 28) What went wrong?
The lesson: watch out for variable not in the nal oil set that does not occur prior to the last block of equations. In enTTS (20, 28 ), x 0 and x 18 did not appear in any earlier equations than the nal block.
Experimentation with mini-versions
We experimented in smaller elds with three dierent schemes: Rainbow (6,6,5,5,11), the enTTS(20,28) scheme above, and its miniaturized sister version enTTS (16, 22) [structure (6, 7,1,1,7 
New Rainbow Parameters for Practical Applications
For practical applications, we will propose the following Rainbow Structures.
1. (20, 10, 4, 10) , where the public key has 44 variables and 24 polynomials. 2. (18, 12, 12) , where the public key has 42 variables and 24 polynomials. 3. (20, 14, 14) , where the public key has 48 variables and 28 polynomials.
We will rst formalize a twist on the regular Rainbow construction, which is somewhat more general. In the previous constructions, in each new layer, previously appeared variables will only be Vinegar variables, the new variables appearing only as Oil variables. We can also consider adding new Vinegar variables as we add Oil variables. This also implies that in the signing process, we guess at the new vinegar variables as they appear, while in the previous Rainbow construction, we only guess the Vinegar variables in the rst layer once. In this case, we can also write for each layer two parameters,
If all the v i are zero, this is precisely the original Rainbow construction. We might call this new construction the extended Oil-Vinegar construction. From the viewpoint of the attacker we can see this as a specialization of the Rainbow construction, since the new vinegar variables might as well have been part of the initial block of vinegar variables, but simply never have been used before. However, it is dierent in an operative sense, in that if we use the new vinegar variables properly, we could always nd a signature, as implicitly used in TTS constructions earlier.
So, in this language, we would propose scheme: ((15, 10), (4, 4), (1, 10)), ((17, 12), (1, 12)), and ( (19, 14) , (1, 14) ).
For these new schemes, we could also choose to use the generic sparse polynomials or special sparse polynomials as in the case of TTS [25] . For generic sparse polynomials, we think it is a good idea to choose 3L i terms for each layer, where L i is the sum of number of Oil and vinegar variables in each layer.
For these new schemes, we need to take into two new recent special attacks against Rainbow.
The Reconciliation Attack
In the following attack we attempt to nd a sequence of change of basis that let us invert the public map. In this sense it can be considered an improved brute force attack.
Suppose we have an oil-and-vinegar structure, then the quadratic part of each component q i in the central map from x to y, when expressed as a symmetric matrix, looks like
First, no matter what M T is, it won't change the basic shape, so we let T be the identity map for the moment. What can S be like? Suppose we pick M S as totally random, most often (see below) it decompose to again make the resulting public map into the same form (all zeroes on the lower right) and be easily inverted. Hence, no more security at all. More about this phenomenon (equivalent keys) in MPKCs can be seen in, say, [23] . Let this essential portion of M S that we wish to recreate be P , that is, the linear transformation w → x = P w will create all zeroes on the lower right. We can decompose this P into a product of P := P v+1 P v+2 · · · P n , where each of the matrices look like
Indeed, the multiplication is actually commutative among the various P i 's. Suppose, then, that we start with the dierential matrices H i and simultaneously transform them to make their lower-right corner a square of 0's using exactly such P i 's.
Algorithm 2 (UOV Reconciliation) The following gives the Reconciliation Attack against a UOV scheme with o oil and v = n − o vinegar variables (which has the smaller indices):
1. Perform basis change w i :
Let all coecients of (w n ) 2 be zero and solve for the λ i . We may use any method such as F 4 /F 5 or FXL. There will be m equations in v unknowns. 3. Repeat the process to nd P n−1 . Now we set w i :
and set every (w n−1 ) 2 and w n w n−1 term to zero (i.e., more equations in the system) after making the substitution. This time there are 2m equations in v unknowns. 4. Continue similarly to nd P n−2 , . . . , P v+1 with more and more equations.
Given what we know about system-solving today, we can expect the complexity to be determined in solving the initial system. Hence, if v < m, solving m equations in v variables will be easier than m equations in n equations, and we achieve a simplication.
Proposition 2. The Reconciliation Attack works with probability
Proof (Sketch). Provided that lower-right o × o submatrix of M S is non-singular, we can see that the construction of P n will eliminate the quadratic term in the last variable. P n−1 will eliminate all quadratic terms in the last two variables, and so on, and each sequential construction will not disturb the structure built by the prior transformations. The number of nonsingular k × k matrices in over
, because the rst row has 1 possibility to be zero, the second row q possibilities to be a multiple of the rst, the third row q 2 possibilities to be dependent on the rst two, etc., so the chance that the above attack works is roughly
Here we will use formulas from [26] for all our estimates as shown below.
Example 4. We attack enTTS(20,28) as in Eq. 1. Originally we must solve a 20-equation, 20-variable (we can guess 8 out of the original 28) MQ system. With v u = 19, the rate-determining step of the Reconciliation Attack is a 20-equation, 19-variable system. This is easier by a factor of exactly 2 8 if we are using FXL or FF 4 [1, 24] , since we will guess exactly one fewer variable.
Since we expect a direct attack on enTTS (20, 28) to have ∼ 2 72 complexity, Alg. 2 should take ∼ 2 64 . The construction process and odds as given above have been tested and veried on miniature versions (cf. [25] ) of TTS schemes such as enTTS (16, 22) as well as other Rainbow-like instances.
Example 5. TRMS [20] can be reduced to 2 64 via the same attack (a faster attack given below) because it has rainbow layer parameters of (8, 6, 2, 3, 9), with a last block of the same size as TTS.
Example 6. We implemented enTTS (16, 22) over GF(128), the initial system has 16 equations and 22 − 7 = 15 variables. We ran FXL with Wiedemann solver (as in [26] ) with one xed variable on an assembly of machines with 128 total P4 cores at 3.0GHz, each guessing 1 value out of 128. Here D = 8 [24] , and the number of monomials is T = 319770, with a total of 73799040 terms which took only 288MB of storage at every core. Solving a system known to have a solution should take around 3(T 2 n(n + 3)/2) ≈ 2 45 multiplications, which at about 16 cycles a multiplication about 2.0 × 10 4 seconds, but we discovered that there is guesswork in generating a system, so we dare not run more than one value on a given CPU.
In practice we were not so unlucky and were able to solve 15 variables in 16 equations in GF(128) in what was in fact closer about 3 days, probably due to non-optimal programming. After that, solving the remaining systems is a piece of cake [real CPU time estimated at less than two hours], and we can then decompose an enTTS (16, 22) instance.
Example 7. We now attack the proposed Rainbow instance in [7] . Since v u = 22 < m = 26, solving this one is signicantly easier: using FF 5 [24] , the expected time use is 2 56 (3DES blocks) instead of 2 81 . F 5 is not generally available but we should be able to achieve ∼ 2 64 cycles using FXL on a large SMP system.
We can easily see that we must be very careful choosing our parameters for security against one attack may expose it to another. Our selected parameters are all tuned against this particular attack and this attack is no better or worse than direct attack, which have complexity of solving 24, and 28 equations in as many variables over GF(256), or roughly 2 83 and 2 98 respectively. But this is just a unbalanced oil and vinegar attack. The more eciently implemented systems are Rainbow and have multiple layers. If we look at the Rainbow construction, it looks more like
(5) That is, only the last o equations looks like Eq. 3, the initial m − o equations actually have non-zero entries in the upperleft submatrix which actually looks like a UOV matrix itself, i.e., has a block of zeros on the lower right. We don't bother with that detail. Can we exploit this property? Yes we can.
At this point, we should no longer consider T as the identity. Let us think about what the matrix M T does in Rainbow. At the moment that we distill the P n portion out, m − o of the new M i 's should show a zero last column. However we don't; M T mixes the M i 's together so that they in fact don't we will see most of the time only the lower right entry as zero. But if we take any o + 1 of those last columns, there will be a non-trivial linear dependency. We can verify that by setting one of those columns as the linear combination as the other o, the resulting equations are still quadratic! Algorithm 3 (Rainbow Band Separation) Reconciliation may be extended for a Rainbow scheme where the nal stage has o oil and v = n − o vinegar variables (which has the smaller indices):
Find m equations by setting all coecients of (w n ) 2 to be zero; there are v variables in the λ i 's. 3. Set all cross-terms involving w n in z 1 − σ
o z m to be zero and nd n − 1 more equations. Note that (w n ) 2 terms are assumed gone already, so we can no longer get a useful equation. 4. Solve m + n − 1 quadratic equations in o + v = n unknowns. We may use any method (e.g., F 4 or XL). 5. Repeat the process to nd P n−1 . Now set
and set every (w n−1 ) 2 and w n w n−1 term to zero after making the substitu-
o z m to have a zero secondto-last column. This time there are 2m + n − 2 equations in n unknowns. 6. Continue in the same vein to nd P n−2 , . . . , P v+1 .
The idea was mentioned by Mr. Yu-Hua Hu to one of the authors in a conversation, for which we are indebted. And this attack explains why the current parameter set suggested looks like that in Sec. 5.
Example 8. We run the attack on an instance of enTTS (16, 22) [25] which has the shape (6, 7, 1, 1, 7) . The algebraic portion of the attack results in a system with 22 variables and 37 equations. This with XL at degree D XL = 6 can be solved using 400MB (actually 415,919,856 bytes) of memory and 123,257 seconds on a 16-core, 2.2GHz Opteron machine with a total of 1,877,572 seconds of K8-CPU time. The number of multiplications is about 2 47 , or ∼ 16 cycles a multiplication.
On a single core, a K8 machine running XL-Wiedemann can average one multiplication in GF(2 8 ) in about 9 cycles. The slowdown comes from the communications requirement between cores.
Example 9. The attack on an instance of enTTS (20, 28) [25] should result in a system with 22 variables and 37 equations. This with XL at degree D XL = 7 should be solvable in 15GB of main memory and about 2 56 multiplications. This is under the design complexity of 2 72 .
We are also testing the prowess of other system-solving methods like Magma's F 4 .
Interlinked/Accumulating Kernels and MinRank
As noted in [25] and recapped in Sec. 3, if µ combinations of central equations stays at the minrank, a Rank attack often speed up µ-fold, and which is termed interlinking or accumulation of kernels.
Recently Billet and Gilbert [4] cryptanalyzed the Rainbow instance of [7] in ∼ 2 64 3DES unit times (they stated 2 71 , but GF(256)-multiplications is a very small unit; NESSIE for example counted 3DES units) using the same principle. While we exhibit a faster attack on that rainbow instance above, the same extended accumulating-kernel minrank attack is more widely applicable:
Proposition 3 (Billet-Gilbert). Kernels of the initial block of equations in a rainbow-like multivariate always accumulate such that any vector in x-space with the initial vinegar components all vanishing has at least a 1/q probability of being found by the MinRank attack.
Example 10. We can cryptanalyze enTTS (20, 28) [25] in 2 64 via the accumulating kernels attack.
In fact, this pitfall is sometimes easy to overlook: Proposition 4. We can cryptanalyze TRMS from [20] Each of these equations are only of rank 8 (the minrank) in GF(256), and the y 17 and y 19 form a pair of equations that has q = 256 interlinked kernels. Evaluating as in Sec. 3 gives ≈ 2 62 .
In our schemes, the attack has complexity roughly q to the number of equations in the rst block times change, which comes out to about 2 85 , 2 100 , 2 118 .
The challenge
From all the above, we can see that we need to be very careful in our design of the parameter for Rainbow like schemes.
Proposition 5. To build a scheme with design security C over the base eld GF(q), we let be the smallest integer such that q +1 C, then:
The initial segment must contain − 1 or more vinegar variables. The nal segment must contain − 1 or more equations and exactly as many as there are total vinegar variables.
There should be enough equations to avoid direct solution via a LazardFaugère solver. Current estimate [24] is that 20 underdetermined equations in GF( 2 8 
